marianne nestor cassini 2020

Meanwhile, around the time the motion practice was taking place on Marianne's motion to vacate, the receiver moved, inter alia, to hold Marianne in civil and criminal contempt for her alleged failure to comply with the October 19, 2016 order. It would make little sense to construe the statute as conferring a stay to protect a client who opposed counsel's application to withdraw due to disability, despite knowing of the attorney's incapacity, while denying a stay to a client who, recognizing that the attorney was disabled, did not object to the attorney's{**182 AD3d at 49} request to withdraw. Marianne also argues that the contempt order was improper, as the October 19, 2016 order she was found to have violated is not a lawful order, as such order was entered during the period when the proceeding was automatically stayed by operation of law. Thus, Marianne knew as of June 8, 2016, that she had to retain new counsel if she wanted to have counsel represent her at the trial. While she is not an attorney, we also recognize that she is a sophisticated litigant and had she raised the issue earlier, much of the ensuing procedural morass may have been avoided. The adverse parties themselves failed to serve the orders and also to serve the petitioner with a notice to appoint new counsel. Ordered that the order dated March 6, 2017, is reversed, on the law, the petitioner's motion to vacate the order dated July 1, 2016, is granted, the order dated July 1, 2016, is vacated, the matter is remitted to the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County, for a new determination of the objectants' cross motion to appoint a receiver, and pending the new determination of the cross motion, the receiver appointed pursuant to the order dated July 1, 2016, shall continue as temporary receiver; and it is further. Her legal team had tried to stop the auction in recent weeks. CPLR 321 provides three pathways by which the attorney of record for a party may seek to be replaced. 182 AD3d 1 [2020]). We agree with the Surrogate Court's determination to grant that branch of the objectants' motion which was for summary judgment sustaining objection 34 to Marianne's account of the estate and to deny that branch of Marianne's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that objection. {**182 AD3d at 37}. This was, under the circumstances, the practical equivalent of more than 30 days' notice to the litigant to appoint new counsel. Where the stay has been violated, the remedy is to vacate the judicial determinations rendered in contravention of the statute (see Livore v Malik, 305 AD2d 641, 642 [2003]; Galletta v Siu-Mei Yip, 271 AD2d at 486; McGregor v McGregor, 212 AD2d at 956; see also Moray v Koven & Krause, Esqs., 15 NY3d at 389; Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C321:3 ["A party against whom an order or judgment is entered in violation of CPLR 321(c) may have the order or judgment vacated"]). Harper also stated that, after the April court date, the cross motion was submitted for decision. Matter of Cassini :: 2020 :: New York Appellate Division, Reppert and his firm filed three identical motions for leave to withdraw as counsel, in the accounting proceeding and in two related proceedings, one commenced by the Public Administrator against Marianne to turn over property alleged to belong to the estate (hereinafter the turnover proceeding), and the other a proceeding relating to a special needs testamentary trust established by Marianne for Daria in accordance with the decedent's will (hereinafter the SNT proceeding). In re Cassini | 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 1055 - Casemine Harper averred that Marianne was evasive with her answers and Marianne had stated that she was aware that her attorneys had moved for leave to withdraw and that she would be seeking to replace them. At the conference, it was announced for the first time, to McKay's knowledge, that a trial in the accounting proceeding was being scheduled to take place on July 25 to 29. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law 431. Here, we conclude that, through no fault of her own, Marianne was not given adequate and proper notice that the cross motion had been marked submitted in April 2016, and she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain substitute counsel and submit opposition papers. The objectants argued that the Surrogate's Court granted RK's motion for leave to withdraw as Marianne's counsel pursuant to CPLR 321 (b) (2), not CPLR 321 (c), and thus the stay Marianne claimed to have arisen under CPLR 321 (c) did not apply. Oleg Cassini's widow released from Nassau's jail Kaplan, in support of the motion by Sills Cummis for leave to withdraw, asserted, in an affirmation submitted in the accounting proceeding, that his role had been to assist Reppert and, with Reppert's health precluding him from continuing to represent Marianne, Kaplan's role was "also ending." The August 2015 order also suspended any authority of Marianne and Peggy to perform any acts as managers, directors, or officers of OCI and CPL. In an order dated June 9, 2016, the Surrogate's Court memorialized the conference held the day before. Even if it is assumed that this finding was not imported into the accounting proceeding until the March 14, 2016 order relieving RK made in that proceeding, and that the stay did not take effect in that proceeding until March 14, 2016, there is no significant consequence as it does not appear that any judicial determinations were rendered in the interval between February 16 and March 14, 2016. Since the issuance of the July 1, 2016 order violated the statutory stay, it should have been vacated. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. On 07/27/2020 Marianne Nestor Cassini filed a Property - Other Real Property lawsuit against Brian Curran. In any event, the Court of Appeals has said that "[t]he stay is meant to 'afford a litigant, who has, through no act or fault of his own, been deprived of the services of his counsel, a reasonable opportunity to obtain new counsel before further proceedings are taken against him in the action'" (Moray v Koven & Krause, Esqs., 15 NY3d at 389, quoting Hendry v Hilton, 283 App Div at 171). Here, Marianne was given such notice by the Surrogate's Court. By order dated October 19, 2016, the Surrogate's Court, inter alia, directed Marianne to perform certain tasks and deliver certain information and documents to the receiver. Repairs, Inc. v Uretsky, 39 AD3d 675, 676-677). While Marianne's letter did not describe the nature of that motion, the record before us includes a notice of motion dated May 13, 2016, in which the objectants sought to preclude Marianne from offering any evidence at the trial of the accounting proceeding. The March 14, 2016 order required the movant, RK, to serve the order upon Marianne and all interested parties within 10 days. Accepting Marianne's version of events, she stated that she had engaged McKay to represent her, with both Marianne and McKay understanding that no trial date had been set. at 1311). . The objectants also argue that neither the November 14, 2017 nor the December 21, 2017 orders are appealable and that, in any event, such orders are valid. In a decision and order dated August 23, 2017, this Court affirmed the grant of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss portions of the legal malpractice complaint (see Nestor v Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP, 153 AD3d 840). Even apart from the violation of CPLR 321 (c), there is an alternative basis for reversal. New legal papers were recently filed by Marianne Nestors attorneys claiming that Tina knew that Oleg Cassini wasnt her father even before her mother died. {**182 AD3d at 22}. The Interplay between CPLR 321 (b) and (c). According to Marianne, the stay continued until 30 days after the attorney for the adverse party sent the notice to appoint attorney required by CPLR 321 (c). The terms of the March 14, 2016 order are essentially similar to those set forth in the February 16, 2016 orders. {**182 AD3d at 41}. The Amended Order Dated November 13, 2017, By notice of motion dated April 12, 2017, Marianne moved pro se to{**182 AD3d at 36}. The Court of Appeals did not agree: CPLR 321 (c) applies to circumstances in which an event occurs which is personal to the attorney of record which involuntarily prevents the attorney of record from continuing to represent the party, notwithstanding the attorney's willingness to do so (see Hendry v Hilton, 283 App Div at 171). Harper, in an affirmation submitted in connection with a later motion, asserted that no attorney from either RK or Sills Cummis appeared on the return date of the withdrawal motions even though an appearance typically was required on the return date of a motion in the Surrogate's Court. That same day, the Surrogate's Court distributed copies of its decision dated June 29, 2016, determining to grant the objectants' cross motion to appoint a receiver (2016 NY Slip Op 32022[U] [Sur Ct, Nassau County 2016]). In this contentious, complex estate litigation, the Surrogate's Court determined, in the context of a motion by the attorneys for the petitioner to withdraw from representing her, that the attorney primarily responsible for the matter had become unable to continue to represent the petitioner due to health reasons. Marianne argued that{**182 AD3d at 31}. On these appeals, we consider the interplay between CPLR 321 (b) (2), which permits the attorney of record for a party to{**182 AD3d at 16} withdraw by order of the court, with the court having the ability to stay proceedings pending substitution of new counsel, and CPLR 321 (c), which automatically and effectively suspends all proceedings against a party whose attorney becomes incapacitated until 30 days after notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party. By the order dated March 6, 2017, the Surrogate's Court denied her motion to vacate. MARIANNE NESTOR CASSINI We also note that Marianne never raised the issue of the CPLR 321 (c) stay until April 2017, when she moved to vacate and nullify all judicial determinations made since March 14, 2016. The defendant then proceeded pro se, which she had the right to do (see id. Whether the CPLR 321 (c) stay took effect on February 16, 2016, or March 14, 2016, the stay was in still in effect when the motion was marked submitted by the court in April 2016 and was still in effect on June 9, 2016, when the court confirmed that marking in its order of that date. While the objectants' brief discusses the March 14, 2016 order, the objectants do not respond to Marianne's contention that the March 14, 2016 order was not released to the parties until May 23, 2016. The March 14, 2016 order, granting RK's withdrawal from representing Marianne in the accounting proceeding, did not explicitly state that Marianne had to find new counsel. We find support for this conclusion in Telmark, where the party was put on notice by his own attorney of the need to find a replacement (see Telmark, Inc. v Mills, 199 AD2d at 580). She averred that it took her at {**182 AD3d at 28}least two weeks to secure the voluminous file from her attorneys. Reppert did not provide any details as to his medical condition or treatment, but offered to do so in camera upon the court's request. CPLR 321 (c) expressly permits the court to grant leave to continue the proceedings, and deny a stay, in particular cases where the attorney of record has been removed or suspended. Matter of Cassini (2020 NY Slip Op 01057) He asserted that Kelly's request should be denied in view of the actions by Marianne and Peggy which were exposing OCI and CPL to waste and "immediate" harm. On a prior appeal, this Court held, in part, that "[a]s the Surrogate's Court essentially and correctly determined, [Christina] established, prima facie, that the decedent's obligation [under the PSA], which merged with the final judgment of divorce, was enforceable as part of that judgment, and that the final judgment was never modified, vacated, or reversed" (id. Developments Subsequent to the Orders Appealed From. Legal Battles Over Oleg Cassinis Estate Continue In making this finding and determination, the court provided the basis for a discretionary withdrawal of counsel under CPLR 321 (b) (2) and simultaneously activated the automatic stay provisions of CPLR 321 (c), as Reppert's judicially determined inability to continue to represent Marianne for health reasons constituted a finding of disability for the purpose of CPLR 321 (c). Following the recess, the court announced that it appeared Marianne had left. Thus, we reverse the order dated March 6, 2017, denying Marianne's motion to vacate the July 1, 2016 order, grant her motion, and vacate the July 1, 2016 order. We consider the context of this matter as well in reaching our conclusion. The Withdrawal of Marianne's Counsel. The court ordered that a warrant of arrest and commitment would issue directing the Nassau County Sheriff to arrest Marianne and take her into custody, and to bring her before the court to be committed to jail until she complied with the October 19, 2016 order. Thus, she had some level of awareness that she had to seek new counsel, either because she was aware of the pending motions for leave to withdraw and/or was aware of the February 16, 2016 orders relieving RK in the turnover and SNT proceedings. The Surrogate's Court issued an order dated December 21, 2017, in which it determined that Marianne had failed to purge her contempt. This contention is unpersuasive. Harper asserted that, after the March 2nd appearance, neither Marianne nor anyone on her behalf requested time to respond to the cross motion. Nothing precludes the court from serving the notice to appoint. Since the client is, by executing the stipulation of substitution, in effect, consenting to the discharge of the attorney of record and simultaneous replacement with another, there is no entitlement to an automatic stay of proceedings by reason of the change in counsel (see Shurka v Shurka, 100 AD3d 566 [2012]), although incoming counsel could always seek a stay from the court (see CPLR 2201). 773 [2020]; Matter of Cassini, 180 AD3d 775 [2020]). Marianne claimed that she was told that the next court appearance would be on June 8, 2016. They contended that CPLR 321 (c) mandated a stay only when a force majeure, like death or incompetency, prevented a party from practicing law. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google, New York Appellate Division, Second Department, New York Appellate Division, Second Department Decisions. Supreme Court of the State of New York Appellate Harper responded by letter dated January 7, 2016, to oppose Kelly's request. The June 9, 2016 order also confirmed that the cross motion to appoint a receiver had been submitted to the Surrogate's{**182 AD3d at 30} Court without opposition back in April 2016. Marianne Nestor Cassini claims the county, Surrogate Court Judge Margaret Reilly, Nassau Public Administrator Brian Curran, the Nassau Sheriff and numerous Kelly averred that he called and spoke with Keller on or about March 16, 2016, to inform her that RK had not received an order determining its motion in the accounting proceeding. We conclude that it was not, bearing in mind that on the July 25, 2016 trial date, Marianne appeared with prospective counsel, McKay. Marianne, in a later reply affidavit, claimed that McKay filed a special appearance for the order to show cause only. "It was at that time that Mr. McKay immediately and promptly withdrew . However, despite knowing that Marianne's counsel was seeking to be relieved and seeking to have a stay imposed pending service of a notice to appoint successor{**182 AD3d at 21} counsel, the objectants cross-moved to appoint a receiver. In approaching our analysis of the interplay between CPLR 321 (b) and (c), there are two anomalous circumstances in this matter which require notation. In dealing with death, removal, or disability of an attorney of record for a party, CPLR 321 (c) postulates the existence of a singular individual who has died, has been removed or suspended, or has become disabled. Daria died in 2010, and litigation followed involving Marianne and Christina regarding a certain testamentary trust established for Daria's benefit (see Matter of Cassini, 120 AD3d 799 [2014]). Marianne cross-moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing objection 34 to the account of the estate. Both CPLR provisions address the replacement of an attorney of record, approaching the topic as if there is but one singular attorney who represents the party in question. By order dated the following day, March 3, 2016, the Surrogate's Court granted Sills Cummis's withdrawal motion in the accounting proceeding. Corp. v Eves, 232 AD2d 370, 370-371 [1996] [no stay where client voluntarily discharged attorney on the first day of trial]). However, none of our cases stand for the proposition that the CPLR 321 (c) stay applies only where the client objected to counsel's motion for leave to withdraw. By letter also dated May 25, 2016, Marianne also wrote to Surrogate Reilly, seeking similar relief, namely, that "since I did not receive the Decision and Order until May 24, 2016 the stay be continued for a minimum of 30 days, from the date of my receipt of your Honor's Decision and Order." According to Harper, Marianne previously attested that OCI and CPL belonged to the decedent's estate but, after it was concluded that Christina had a one-quarter interest in the estate, Marianne claimed that Marianne, individually, owned all of the estate assets. Christina petitioned pursuant to SCPA 1809 to determine the validity of her claim against the estate (see Matter of Cassini, 95 AD3d at 1312). Skip Cassini Kelly stated: "We also believe it was timed to provide the least amount of time possible to prepare an opposition and with the knowledge that we are shorthanded due to Mr. Reppert's infirmity." Legal Battles Over Oleg Cassinis Estate Continue - WWD B230315]); in litigation she commenced in New York County, alleging defamation "based on allegedly false and {**182 AD3d at 54}disparaging statements in an article published in the September 2010 issue of Vanity Fair (Cassini Royale) that reports on plaintiff's secret marriage to the late designer, Oleg Cassini, and her conduct in litigation concerning his estate" (Cassini v Advance Publs., Inc., 125 AD3d 467, 468 [2015], affg 41 Misc 3d 1202[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51553[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2013] [affirming order granting defendants' motion to dismiss complaint and denying plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b for an extension of time to serve]); and in litigation she commenced alleging legal malpractice against the estate's former attorneys (see Nestor v Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP, 153 AD3d 840 [2017]). Kelly claimed that over the next five weeks, he called the Surrogate's Court multiple times. ORDERED that the appeal by Peggy Nestor from so much of the order as denied that branch of the cross motion of Marianne Nestor Cassini which was for summary judgment dismissing objection 34 to the account of the estate is dismissed, as Peggy Nestor is not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156-157); and it is further. In the letter, Harper set forth his narrative of the proceeding. Marianne urged that Reppert's affirmation made clear that he was willing to provide additional medical proof at the court's request. According to Kelly, when after more than one month had passed and he had not received either a response from Keller or a decision on the motions, he called the court on March 1, 2016, and spoke with both Keller and a secretary, Lori Muscarella. Marianne Nestor, the widow of late fashion designer Oleg Cassini, is in jail for not following court orders related to the protracted legal battle over his $55 million estate. The disability of the attorney of record is also within the purview of CPLR 321 (c), whether that disability be mental or physical (see Winney v County of Saratoga, 252 AD2d 882, 883 [1998]). In an affirmation executed December 9, 2015, bearing a caption indicating that it pertained to the accounting proceeding, Reppert asserted that he was a member of RK, attorneys for Marianne "in connection with this action," and that he submitted the affirmation in support of counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel for Marianne. The court stated that the same relief was requested and denied at the trial, and that the trial had taken place. His last will and testament was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County{**182 AD3d at 17} (see Matter of Cassini, 95 AD3d 1311, 1312 [2012]). By Bridget Murphy Kelly emailed Keller that day, with copies to Harper, among others. In Moray, this Court affirmed the Supreme Court's order granting the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) to dismiss the action for failure to timely serve a complaint, holding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's contention that the action{**182 AD3d at 44} had been stayed pursuant to CPLR 321 (c) was raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, was not properly before us (see Moray v Koven & Krause, Esqs., 62 AD3d 765 [2009], revd 15 NY3d 384 [2010]). {**182 AD3d at 27}It is notable that proceedings took place on April 6, 2016, without Marianne's participation, in the context of the accounting proceeding. One of those motions was to adjourn the trial. Marianne Nestor Cassini (referred to in the will of Oleg Cassini as Marianne Nestor) was appointed executor of the estate and trustee on August 15, 2007. Oleg Cassini Since McKay was not permitted to attend the conference as he was unwilling to enter a formal appearance, it cannot be said that Marianne's decision to participate in the conference without the benefit of counsel was wholly voluntary. The assets included, among others, Oleg Cassini, Inc. (hereinafter OCI), and Cassini Parfums, Ltd. (hereinafter CPL). Kelly stated that he just received the cross motion to appoint a receiver, also returnable on January 13, 2016, which he described as voluminous and complex and which, he asserted, bore no relationship to the pending motions for leave to withdraw. It is undisputed that no party sought leave of the Surrogate's Court to take further proceeding against Marianne and that no formal notice to appoint another attorney was served on her. Under the circumstances, argued Kelly, Marianne did not have sufficient time to adequately respond to the cross motion. In or around December 2015, Marianne's attorneys moved for leave to withdraw from representing her. However, as above noted, there is nothing in the record before us that indicates that anyone served the March 14, 2016 order on anyone else, or that any of the counsel involved in this matter had any contemporaneous awareness of the existence of this order. The inclusion of Kelly of RK, and the exclusion of Marianne, as recipient of the motion, supports a conclusion that Farrell Fritz, P.C., as attorneys for the movants, was unaware, as of May 13, 2016, that RK's motion for leave to withdraw had been decided two months earlier. First, pursuant to CPLR 321 (b) (1), the attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by a stipulation signed by the outgoing attorney and signed and acknowledged by the client, with notice to be provided to the other parties to the action (see CPLR 321 [a]). You're all set! Kelly noted that the unopposed motions by RK and Sills Cummis for leave to withdraw were returnable on January 13, 2016. While Marianne's right to counsel, and her rights under CPLR 321 (c), should be protected, so too should the objectants' rights to prevent dissipation or looting of the estate and its assets. Oleg Cassini's widow files $350M lawsuit over long estate battle April 2, 2022 | 10:01am. Oleg Cassini (hereinafter the decedent), the internationally renowned fashion designer, died in March 2006 (see Matter of Cassini, 120 AD3d 799, 799 [2014]). Cassini "Under CPLR 5015 (a), a court is empowered to vacate a default judgment [or order] for several reasons, including excusable neglect; newly-discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by an adverse party; lack of jurisdiction; or upon the reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior order" (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]; see CPLR 5015 [a]; HSBC Bank USA v Josephs-Byrd, 148 AD3d 788 [2017]; 40 BP, LLC v Katatikarn, 147 AD3d 710 [2017]). Second, CPLR 321 (b) (2) permits the attorney of record for a party to be changed by order of the court. In her affidavit submitted in support of that motion, Marianne claimed that there was never a briefing schedule set on that cross motion, and that she was never given an opportunity to submit an opposition to that cross motion. Kelly, in an affirmation submitted in connection with a later motion, asserted that on or about January 29, 2016, Kelly{**182 AD3d at 23} called Shifrin to inquire about the status of the withdrawal motions. In Telmark, Inc. v Mills (199 AD2d 579 [1993]), the Appellate Division, Third Department, found, on the facts presented, that there was no violation of CPLR 321 (c). In a probate proceeding in which Marianne Nestor Cassini, the former executor of the estate of Oleg Cassini, petitioned for judicial settlement of her There is no merit to the objectants' contention that because Marianne no longer had authority to administer OCI or CPL, she was not aggrieved by the appointment of a receiver for those entities. Seddio & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn (Frank R. Seddio and Mischel & Horn, P.C. No adjournments were allowed; if no opposition was interposed, the motion would be submitted without it.[FN6]. The objectants opposed Marianne's motion to vacate. Christina petitioned pursuant to SCPA 1809 to determine the validity of her claim against He was survived by his wife, Marianne Nestor Cassini (hereinafter Marianne), and two daughters from his prior Marianne and her sister Peggy Nestor separately appeal from the order dated November 5, 2015. The widow of fashion icon Oleg Cassini was released Friday after spending six months in jail for contempt of court. Since the cross motion was made in the context of the accounting proceeding, the court should not have taken the matter under submission, without opposition, during the period of its own stay. In this Court, Marianne unsuccessfully sought to stay the accounting trial (2016 NY Slip Op 81906[U] [2016]). Likewise, a stay may be refused where the removal of counsel was the product of the client's own wrongful act (see RDLF Fin. Cassini of County Attorney, 61 NY2d 739, 742 [1984] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. Marianne's claims against OCI and CPL were disallowed. We dismiss Marianne's appeal from the order dated December 21, 2017, inter alia, directing that a warrant of arrest and commitment issue, because no appeal lies as of right from an order that does not decide a motion made on notice (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2]; LaSalle Bank N.A. "Furthermore, as the Surrogate's Court also essentially and correctly determined, [Marianne] failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the enforceability of that obligation, which [Christina] first sought to enforce after the decedent's death, via the imposition of a constructive trust upon certain assets of the decedent's estate" (id.). Indeed, stays of proceedings, albeit in the turnover and SNT proceedings, had been in effect intermittently since February 16, 2016, leading to the prospect of understandable confusion as to the status of these matters. Christina filed a claim asserting her entitlement to 25% of the decedent's net estate, and petitioned for a determination as to the validity and enforceability of her claim. Those objections alleged that Marianne's account of the decedent's estate omitted certain items that had been previously identified as assets of the estate by Marianne in various documents, including a New York State estate tax return executed by Marianne in her capacity as executor of the decedent's estate. First, in Telmark, the defendant's attorney did give his client notice that she needed to appoint a new attorney. The order determined that the shares of OCI and CPL identified in schedule A of Marianne's account were assets of the estate and directed Marianne to turn over all stock certificates and financial and banking records for OCI and CPL to the Public Administrator, as administrator c.t.a. Matter of Cassini Indeed, CPLR 321 (c) provides that the "removal" of the attorney of record brings about a stay, without regard to whether the removal was with or without the client's consent. Marianne Nestor Cassini claims the county, Surrogate Court Judge Margaret Reilly, Nassau Public Administrator Brian Curran, the Nassau Sheriff and numerous others want to get Mrs. Cassini out of the way while they sold-off her and her husbands property for their own personal profit. The objectants contend that, because Marianne did not oppose the motions for leave to withdraw, she cannot rely on the provisions of CPLR 321 (c) and, in any event, as a sophisticated businessperson, she forfeited any right to a stay under CPLR 321 (c) by electing to represent herself from June 2016 forward.

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